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In This Issue:

A. Shastitko: “The purpose of this article is to determine the ways of addressing and the constraints on the solution of the problem of a ‘dysfunctional’ mutation of the norms of open access social orders in limited access systems as illustrated by the tools of antitrust policy.”

Ya. Pappé: “...government completely lost its legitimacy in the USSR back in the 1980s. State property lost it at the same time, while the newly emerged non-state property did not acquire it. Naturally, this led to the collapse of all institutions associated with property. Let us also recall that law enforcement institutions in the late USSR were destroyed not by a dozen or so liberal-minded advocates of a free market but by mass demonstrations of supporters of ‘socialism with a human face,’ who broke through police cordons, urged the KGB to repent, and made heroes out of convicted dissidents.”

V. Kozlov: “Consequently, the third document, Beria’s *Private Diary*, has been compiled by the same person. Two motives prompted the forgery of documents. First, the desire to use Beria’s *Private Diary* to present the latter as a humane statesman concerned about the good of his country and feels strongly about his own and others’ mistakes. Second, to use a forged document allegedly discovered after the publication of Kremlin’s book *Beria. The Best Manager of the 20th Century*, to bolster his general and specific conclusions about the activities of the protagonist of this book.”

S. Papkov: “the war had brought little change to the workers’ attitude to work at state enterprises. The statistics of truancy, of leaving the workplace without permission and the resulting convictions indicated that labor discipline had not improved. The problem was solved, as before, through introducing more severe criminal punishment.”

A. Karpov: “Sinyavsky was sure that creative triumphs in art only come to those who consciously break its norms and rules. In his opinion, Pushkin was ‘ahead of progress’: ‘He would never have written *Eugene Onegin* if he did not know that this was not the way to write.’”

G. Danilina: “A history of philology today is sorely needed: Russia is changing, much of the scholarly heritage including the ‘old’ historical approach has been relentlessly crushed and cast aside. One cannot fail to see that this approach is being reinvented on new, modern foundations. The question of ‘national identity’ in the history of Russian science, in our opinion, will be instrumental in resolving the pressing task: not to lose what may support philology today, in spite of all the upheavals and changes.”

Ye. Krotkov: “Humankind has an abiding need for a ‘redemptive truth,’ fathoming the elusive ultimate foundations of the eternal world and the intransient meaning of our short life in it. ... One would like to get rid of any form of coercion in accepting any worldview doctrine as ‘the only correct one’ and the imposition on that basis of its values and regulations on the whole of society as institutional foundations.”

V. Inozemtsev: “Putin’s regime has successfully survived yet another critical moment in its history, and it seems these days that its future—contrary to that of Russia—looks relatively cloudless.”

V. Pryakhin: “With the collapse of the Soviet Union independent Kyrgyzstan suddenly found itself in the forefront of world politics... The dramatically increased ‘strategic value’ of Kyrgyzstan opened up new opportunities for the country’s political elite giving rise to illusions about playing on the contradictions between various power centers to achieve its own political goals...”

V. Znakov: “In our day and age, the alleged standoff and incompatibility of Christian and Muslim values has moved from the cultural to political and sociopsychological sphere, where coexistence of people and their tolerance of each other are emerging as the overriding requirement. Both scientific studies and political trends of development in the modern world are clearly pointing to some unresolved problems in this area.”

A. Kiva: “China’s main advantage over Russia has been the subjective factor. But it proved to be a decisive advantage.”

The Enemy Image in Habitual Consciousness: “Muslim Terrorists” and Their Perception by Russians¹

Viktor ZNAKOV

The modern world has been changing rapidly, with outbursts of popular discontent in Egypt, Syria, Libya and other countries, the “orange” and other revolutions, Occupy Wall Street!, and financial upheavals in Europe as some cases in point. The enemy image, against this background, has become a significant component of the mass consciousness, and the finger is increasingly pointed at the Muslims. In our day and age, the alleged standoff and incompatibility of Christian and Muslim values has moved from the cultural to political and sociopsychological sphere, where coexistence of people and their tolerance of each other are emerging as the overriding requirement. Both scientific studies and political trends of development in the modern world are clearly pointing to some unresolved problems in this area.

In 2005, the United States published a study of American Christian attitudes to local Muslims, revealing a latent prejudice towards Muslims, which could only be identified by the *implicit association test*.² The worse the attitude to Muslims, the higher the anti-Arab racism, right-wing authoritarianism, and religious fundamentalism.³ Similar intolerance tendencies are observed in Europe. Addressing a Christian Democratic Youth conference on October 18, 2010, Chancellor Angela Merkel made a sensational statement to the effect that multiculturalism was a total fiasco. This followed the publication of the book whose author, the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Head Thilo Sarrazin (*Germany Is Doing Away With Itself. How We Put On Stake Our Country [Deutschland schafft sich ab. Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen]*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2010), openly charged that Germany was being threatened by Muslim migrants. In February 2011, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France also admitted the collapse of multiculturalism that was directed at perpetuating and promoting the cultural and religious diversity in French society.

Yet the responsibility for failing to evolve a multiethnic and multiconfessional nation is shared by both Muslims and Christians. A 2006 poll revealed that 98% of Germans identified Islam with terror and violence, 83% characterized Muslims as religious fanatics, 61% doubted that Islam could peacefully coexist

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with Christianity, and only 6% were sympathetic toward Islam.⁴ At the same time, societal integration can be fatally affected by addresses of the kind the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, made to 20,000 enthusiastic Turkish migrants in Cologne: “No one should expect that you assimilate. Assimilation is a crime against humanity.”⁵ But the Islamic world has nothing to show as for overcoming the atmosphere of enmity either. In 2011, scientists from the Istanbul University conducted a study purporting to gauge the incidence of extremist and radical views among the young people. They polled 1,500 residents of different cities in the 17-25 age bracket to reveal that 60% of respondents would not like to have Jews and 52% Christians as their neighbors.

Often accompanied by extremist outrages, the growth of the Islamic factor in public and political life is observed in many regions of the world. A typical case in point is a series of terrorist attacks against Nigerian congregations following feast rites. On December 25, 2011, five Christian churches were bombed in different Nigerian cities during Christmas mass, with Boko Haram, a radical Islamist group, assuming responsibility. The name of this political association, incidentally, can be interpreted as a “ban on the Western (non-Muslim) way of life.” The group is pressing for the acceptance of the Shariah law across this most populated African country (150 million people).

Similarly, an Islamic revival is observed in Russia, where it is manifested in the growth of a Salafiyah-based fundamentalist movement (Salafiyah is a current in Islam rooted in the lifestyle and observances characteristic of the early Muslim community, which tends to look at all innovations as a damnable fallacy) directed at a political struggle that should lead to the capture of power and establishment of an Islamic state (*caliphate*) in the North Caucasus.”⁶ No wonder that many prominent public figures and scientists are concerned that the negative aspect of Islam penetrating to many regions of the world is a shift in the interpretation of human values that allows of terrorist attacks and other types of mass violence. Viktor Petrenko writes this: “We proceed in our premises from the fact that ideologically 09/11/01 was a pathogenic mutation of Islam which, as one of the world religions, is based on a certain set of general human values; as a mutation, it can also happen within some other religious or quasireligious consciousness.”⁷

In psychology, a more general context in relation to the conflictive standoff of Christian and Muslim values is analyzing the external and internal psychological conditions that shape the enemy image. As a political and sociopsychological problem, the latter is a highly topical thing for this country. In Russia of today, the dichotomies like “we—they” or “friend—foe” are, regrettably, part of the everyday reality. All politicians and public figures pay lip service to general well-being and fair social organization. But, being ignorant of the basics of social psychology, they often choose methods that serve to encourage social hostility and fan interethnic and interfaith strife. A case in point is the motto—“For ethnic Russians!”—accepted by one of the parliamentary parties.

Participants in recurrent public debates mention numerous political parties, movements and faiths, whose names clearly clash with their ostensible purpose to unite Russian society. *Nashi* (Our Guys), National Popular Front, and People’s

Emergency Volunteer Corps, Muslim Terrorism etc., are just some examples. The massive youth involvement in *Nashi* is based on the social perception that there are also “guys other than ours.” Popping up in the same debates are references to “Muslim terrorism,” a politically incorrect and essentially wrong saying that divides Muslims (in 2003, Vladimir Putin said that there were nearly 20 million Muslims living in Russia) and Russians who profess other faiths or no faith at all. During peacetime, in a country that is not at war, it is an odd thing to hear about an emergency volunteer corps, a wartime unit intended to bring to strength an army in the field. Those who named a new political movement “The National Popular Front” certainly used one of the figurative meanings of the word “front” (“a broad movement in which different groups are united for the achievement of certain common political or social aims”⁸). Meanwhile, the majority of its lexicographic meanings imply the advanced line, or the whole area, of contact between *opposing* sides in warfare.

It could be expected that in Russia, a country with a rich military history, people who have no truck with politics would primarily actualize the direct meaning of the word “front,” linked to warfare and confrontation. A preliminary empirical confirmation of this assumption could be obtained via elementary polls. In summer 2011, I asked 50 persons from seven cities to say off the cuff what three words they associated with the notion of “front.” One hundred twenty-seven associations out of 150 were about confrontation in the social and natural worlds: “struggle,” “enemies,” “death,” “stormy,” and so on, while only 23 replies alluded to “a public association,” “popular,” “corruption,” or “Roth Front.” As is obvious, their minds were dominated by the main meaning of the concept under discussion ($\chi^2 = 72.11$; $p < 0.001$). So, using this kind of language will explicitly (and even more implicitly at the subconscious level) divide people on different grounds rather than unite them.

What I said about the dichotomies could be regarded as folly, were it not for the fact that the abovementioned discursive opposites do generate conflicts in the minds of many Russians. Since consciousness is inseparably connected with action, the conflictive perceptions embedded in large social groups are often displayed in a behavior directed against those whom they refuse to accept internally and reject at the behavioral level. Suffice it to recall the rioting in Kondopoga, Karelia, in September 2006, in Manezhnaya Square, Moscow, on December 11, 2010, the attacks against *Nashi* pickets by Boris Nemtsov’s supporters next to the investigative detention facility where their leader was kept in January 2011, and more.

An important result of the previous probes⁹ is the understanding that the Russians’ knowledge of terrorist psychology is based on the enemy image, an alien that would sooner inspire fear and deadly apprehensions than compel a rational consideration of terrorism-related problems.

The *main aim* of this article is to find out whether habitual consciousness of Russians links the enemy image to someone professing Islam and whether they rank Russian citizens committing terrorist attacks as Muslim terrorists.

Three studies were carried out for the purpose.

Ethnic and Religious Identity of Test Persons and Their Representations on Terrorists

A widespread judgment in scientific writings is one on the ethnic and religious origin of terrorism. It is claimed that the majority of terrorist attacks are committed by Islamic radical fundamentalists and, consequently, the Muslim religious worldview is allegedly a source and nutritional medium for terrorists. The study's *first* stage, in this connection, was to determine whether Russians agreed with this judgment. It involved 661 residents of Moscow, Samara, Saransk and the Krasnodar Territory (Sochi, Maykop, Krasnodar), including 423 women and 238 men aged from 17 to 85 years ($M = 27.7$ years, $SD = 12.1$).

Methodology. The test persons anonymously answered five questions. The first one was this: What ethnic and religious group committed most terrorist attacks in Russia? Respondents were to choose from the nine formally recognized denominations: Orthodox Christians; Roman Catholics; Protestants; Volga Muslims (Tatars, Bashkirs, etc.); North Caucasian Muslims (Chechens, Dagestanis, Ingushs, etc.); Central Asian Muslims (Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.); "outside" Muslims (Arabs, Turks, Kurds, and others that are permanently resident in Russia); Jews (those subscribing to the Jewish religious and cultural traditions); Buddhists; and atheists.

Next they had to indicate on a six-point scale (ranging from "Fully Agree" to "Totally Disagree") the degree of their agreement/disagreement with the following three statements: "People from this ethnic and religious group constitute a considerable part of Russia's population and have the same right to their religious faith (including to the performance of rites in the specialized places of worship) as I"; "Any representative of this ethnic and religious group other than terrorist can be a good and kind man"; "People from this ethnic and religious group can be my friends."

In conclusion, the last question was about a person's self-identification: "Please indicate which of the above groups you identify yourself with."

The statistical processing of the data was performed with the help of the χ^2 method and the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test.

Results. 545 out of the 661 respondents believe that terrorist attacks are most often committed by North Caucasian Muslims: $\chi^2 = 278.4$; $p < 0.001$. The statistical test value with the probability error of 0.1% warrants the conclusion that this is a legitimate rather than random view of the given sample of respondents. The study involved 90 persons who identified themselves with the North Caucasian Muslims, with 67 of them sharing the view that it was North Caucasian Muslims who most often perpetrated terrorist attacks ($\chi^2 = 25.1$; $p < 0.001$).

The two most numerous parts of the sample were Orthodox Christians (443) and North Caucasian Muslims (90). How do their replies differ? Christians would rather disagree, while Muslims would rather agree to terrorists having the right to a religious faith of their own ($U = 11,598$; $p < 0.001$). Christians would agree, if to a smaller degree, that a Muslim may be a good person ($U = 16,320$; $p < 0.004$).

But if we analyze the entire sample, it becomes clear that the test persons as a whole have displayed religious tolerance: 458 agree that terrorists have the

right to profess their own religious faith, and only 203 disagree ($\chi^2 = 98.4$; $p < 0.001$). Comparing 458 and 203 shows that the former have more faith in the goodness of an ethnic group that has brought forth terrorists ($U = 34,721$; $p < 0.001$). Unlike them, the latter do not want to have friends from that ethnic and religious group ($U = 30,399$; $p < 0.001$).

So, first, there is no doubt that a considerable part of Russians associate terrorist attacks with Muslim terrorism. Second, the fundamental acceptance or rejection of North Caucasian Muslims as potential terrorists applies to this entire ethnic and religious group, including the specific perception of its separate members as good, kind men and potential friends of the test persons.

Attitudes to Muslims and Personal Traits of the Test Persons

The *second* stage was to describe personal traits of people showing more or less positive attitudes to Muslims. It involved 153 residents of Moscow, Samara and Oryol (91 women and 62 men) aged from 17 to 58 years ($M = 30.4$ years, $SD = 12.9$).

Methodology. The test persons began by anonymously filling the following questionnaires: *Resilience Test*, as adapted by Dmitry Leontyev and Yelena Rasskazova; *Personal Differential* (Yevgeny Bazhin and Aleksandr Etkind); and John Templer's *Death Apprehension Scale (DAS)* as adapted by Tatyana Gavrilova. Next they answered 12 questions on a six-point scale (ranging from "Fully Agree" to "Totally Disagree"). The questions were about four subject areas: the test persons' representations about terrorists' personal and sociodemographic characteristics; estimates regarding the likelihood of falling victim to terrorism; attitudes to methods used in counterterrorist operations; attitudes to Muslims. Here we will only analyze the reply to the key question from the last group: "It is hard for Russians to have as good an attitude to Muslims as to Orthodox Christians."

Results. The main aim was to identify personal differences between the test persons who agree and disagree that it is hard to have as good an attitude to Muslims as to Orthodox Christians. The former group (84 persons) was no different from the latter (69) in terms of gender but was slightly younger: $M = 27.9$ and $M = 33.5$; $p < 0.03$. In χ^2 terms, the differences between the number of group members are statistically insignificant. So, it cannot be claimed that the sample is dominated by either "assenters" or "dissenters." But do they differ in terms of personal characteristics?

Those who agree that it is hard to accept Muslims boast a higher self-evaluation of their own moral qualities (*Evaluation Scale* from the methodology *Personal Differential*: $U = 2,067$, $p < 0.002$) as well as endurance and stamina (*Strength Scale*: $U = 2,077$, $p < 0.002$). At the same time, *Death Apprehension Scale* demonstrates that they feel keenly the brevity of human life ($U = 869$, $p < 0.007$) and fear pain and stress ($U = 881$, $p < 0.01$). They also have a lower resilience index ($U = 469$, $p < 0.05$) and lower marks on the *Involvement Scale* ($U = 440$, $p < 0.03$).

So, the fundamental conviction based on the worldview which says that it is difficult to conceive a good attitude to Muslims stems from a person's individual

psychological traits. The assenters have a higher self-estimate that combines with the realization that life is fast-flowing and inevitably draws to a fatal end; they fear physical pain and stress that may affect one along with fatal diseases. People characterized by a better attitude to Muslims boast greater resilience that stands in the way of inner tensions brought about by stressful situations (they can stably cope with the stress and look at unpleasant developments as something insignificant). They are also convinced that being involved in what is going on offers one the biggest chance to find something of value and interest.

The linkage between personal qualities and the images of Muslim terrorists existing in one's consciousness corresponds to the findings of earlier studies that investigated Russians' understanding of and sentiments in connection with the terrorist threat.¹⁰ Machiavellians are not as emotional over a possibility of falling victim to a terrorist attack as their opposite numbers. They see terror as primarily a method for terrorists and forces behind them to address problems and achieve certain aims: "It is an attempt to solve one's problems at the expense of others." The test persons with high grades of situation control on the *Basic Convictions Scale* view terrorist attacks as a means of achieving political, religious and other objectives by emotionally disturbed individuals who see no other way of dealing with problems: "Terrorist attacks are perpetrated by people who have fear (and therefore attack from behind), but know no other methods."

Thus, a study of religious preferences of people in the context of terrorist threat perceptions should certainly include some psychological components.

Territorial Differences in Attitudes to Muslim Terrorists

Stage three analyzed regional differences of Russians in their attitudes to the government's antiterrorist strategy. The aim of stage *three* was to compare the results obtained in Kazan with those of Moscow and Saransk. Tatars make up more than a half of residents in Kazan¹¹ and it could be assumed that the proportion of Muslims among them was higher than in the other two cities. The study at this stage involved 390 residents of Moscow, Saransk and Kazan (242 women and 149 men) aged from 17 to 74 years ($M = 25.3$ years, $SD = 11.4$).

Methodology. The test persons answered the same 12 questions as at stage two. We analyzed replies that came from different cities on the scale of attitudes to methods of counterterrorist operations. The scale included these three questions. "The Russian government, unlike its Western counterparts, is very hard on talks with terrorists: we will never negotiate with terrorists; terrorists should be destroyed, not talked to. Do you agree with this point of view?" "Terrorist attacks perpetrated in the Russian Federation are mostly the consequence of inefficiency of law enforcement bodies." "The government should engage in antiterrorism on the basis of rule-of-law methods; rather than destroy, it must arrest and bring them to trial. For example, if militants have dug in an encircled house, the law enforcers should set up a long siege (for the besieged to run out of food) rather than fire at and destroy the house."

Results. Respondents in Kazan do not agree that terrorists should be destroyed rather than talked to; those in Saransk, on the contrary, believe that talks are unnecessary: $U = 5,285, p < 0.01$. Moscow concurs with Saransk and differs from Kazan: $U = 6,871, p < 0.001$. None of the groups accepts that terrorists should be treated on the basis of rule-of-law methods alone. But the respondents in Moscow and Saransk are more categorical in their nonacceptance than Kazan: $U = 8,736, p < 0.02$; $U = 6,345, p < 0.04$. All the test persons agree that the law enforcers are inefficient; there are no significant differences between the groups of respondents.

So, many Russians believe that the government's main task is to destroy terrorists rather than arrest them and bring to trial. Personally I cannot accept this view because, to my mind, a civilized country differs from a gang of criminals in that it is orientated to laws rather than emotions or the self-preservation instinct. In summing up the regional differences, we can say that the group in Kazan, which presumably numbers more Muslims than the other two, believe that terrorists should be talked to. They are less convinced that it is impossible to fight terrorism by the rule-of-law methods alone. Quite likely, this does not mean that they would exculpate terrorists, but they can certainly better understand their motivation. We might assume that the Kazan group, who know the Islamic world and its sociocultural traditions better than the groups in Moscow and Saransk, are aware that the terrorists are a different race in terms of worldview and behavior and should be accepted as such.

General Discussion

The overwhelming majority of test persons were sure that terrorist attacks were most often committed by North Caucasian Muslims. A similar result was obtained in the US by Jaihyun Park *et al.*, who found that terrorism was the most important attribute associated with Arab-Muslims. And this is not particularly surprising, because evaluating a possible terrorist threat has become a personal and national security priority for the Americans in the 21st century.¹²

Of much importance in this context is making a scientific analysis of two psychological and sociocultural issues, namely, regularities in shaping the image of a *xenos* (an alien), or in particular, of the enemy image, and identifying oneself with the Other. I will try to prove that the two issues are closely interlinked and that one cannot be analyzed unless we study in depth the other.

The two are as old as the rocks: the Greeks set themselves in opposition to the barbarians, Christians to heathens, and West to East. These and other opposites are based on the so-called negative identity, or the wish to interpret the distinctness and otherness of the Other as one's own distorted identity rather than understand what they are all about. Even Herodotus in his history of the Greek-Persian wars used to apply to the Persians a set of negative stereotypes depicting them as avaricious, treacherous and uncultured; if they won, it was solely by their uncountable numbers, while Greeks won by courage and military expertise. In

our day and age, much popularity attended the publication of Edward Said's book on Orientalism as a Western perception model dictating attitudes to other cultures. Its burden was in that Western writings were rife with stereotypes regarding the otherness and backwardness of the East and particularly the Islamic world. At the same time, they are depriving it of an identity and sovereignty.¹³ Interpreted in this way, the entire Eastern world is largely perceived as a distorted, wrong, and underdeveloped Western world.

But instead of identifying with and seeking to comprehend the psychology of others, this negative projection can only generate enemy images and hinder self-understanding of people in the West. This is due to the fact that "the 'not-I,' the *xenos* (the alien), is anyway a construction of our Ego, because from it we will select precisely what, in some way or other, echoes our own Ego. This means that our Ego image is built in into the model of the Other. Following from this is the fourth principle (of xenology.—V.Z.): the *xenos* image in this or that culture (as well as for this or that personality) can serve as an important indicator of its own development level: tell me what your *xenos* is, and I will tell you what you are! For the *xenos* image can be a tool of both self-assertion (most often) and self-understanding, self-appraisal, self-criticism and even self-improvement! To put it differently, the *xenos* image is a custom-made thing that includes the Ego image, its fears, expectations, complexes, jealousy, love, hatred, fairness perception, etc."¹⁴

There is a focus in modern science on studying how people form representations on someone other than I and the enemy image.¹⁵

A psychological probe into bullying,¹⁶ specifically its school variety, can be a socially important empirical context in studying the said issues. Its students, Vladimir Sobkin and Olga Markina, testify that "the comments of all those involved in the bullying behavior point to the problem of 'otherness': 'greenhorns,' 'silly things,' 'naïve and trustful,' 'intriguers' and 'odd birds' would fall victim to baiting. The old hands would see each of them as 'not one of us,' as a dissenter that rejects his or her group identity and therefore is branded as an 'alien element of society.'"¹⁷

A clear theoretical grounding of the differentiation between something that is one's own, something that is someone else's (not yet one's own but capable of becoming it) and something that is alien and unacceptable under any circumstances can be found in the thesaurus concept of subjective knowledge organization¹⁸ and in the alien perception model devised by Bernd Schäfer and Bernd Schlöder.¹⁹ The model characterizes the concept of other (man) by a combination of three variables: knowledge, experience and identity (as something unknown, untested and not "one's own").

The other than one's own as something unknown. The other than one's own in this instance implies everything in the Other that a person does not know, or is indifferent to, or apprehensive of, and even antipathetic. The lack of knowledge is compensated with stereotypes: as people try to make head or tail of critical situations, social stereotypes are often formed out of the thin air simply because "fear has big eyes." Previous studies,²⁰ for example, demonstrated that the con-

text and semantic background of understanding were the stereotyped and irrelevant representations on terrorists as uneducated, deranged and aggressive fanatics for whom someone else's life is not worth a dime. We can say without any exaggeration that 99% of test persons interpret terrorists' psychology in the following way: "They are mentally ill people harboring bitter feelings or a grudge against someone"; "detesting their own people, they are scant-brained, immoral, unfeeling, lost, embittered, and death-seeking individuals"; "they are religious fanatics incapable of controlling themselves because of a psychological or other influence on their will; they do not care about human life and will take it for money"; "they are people who hate the whole world"; "suicide-minded individuals unconcerned with other people's lives; they lost faith in goodness and peace." But this psychological profile is at odds with numerous scientific data. According to investigations, terrorists are not characterized by high levels of psychopathy;²¹ they are highly religious, polite, grave, calm, purpose-oriented, aloof and laconic.²² This profile differs radically from the stereotypical image of an impulsive and cruel Muslim terrorist. Nevertheless, the majority of our test persons tend to look for causes of terrorist attacks primarily in the psychological setup and aims of those who plan and perform explosions (specifically, in the Moscow Metro).

The other than one's own as something not experienced. "Phenomena that a person has some knowledge of but fails to master can also be perceived as something alien... in which case the properties and forms of behavior of a strange object are known but they are untested or lived through under specific circumstances."²³ In our studies this form of understanding was displayed in a kind of knowledge about Muslim terrorists that people fail to sufficiently rationalize. Residents in Samara, Oryol and other cities lacked an immediate understanding and emotional experience with regard to terrorist attacks, and therefore their knowledge failed to form part of their existential experience. Owing to the acquisition of new knowledge and its internalization, something other than one's own may either become one's own or definitively turn into an alien thing, the "not one's own," that is incompatible with a person's values.

The other than one's own as the "not one's own." The not one's own, the alien is what contradicts a person's values, standards, principles and vital orientations. The "not one's own" in the model under discussion is defined as such a disparity with a person's principal peculiarities, the perception of which involves a negative emotional valency, whereas perceiving the "one's own" involves a positive one.

"The specific problems attending the perception of something that is not one's own result from a certain constellation of three variables: the unknown, the mastered, and the attitude to 'the one's own.' In a more specific and restricted sense as just something unknown and untested, the not one's own means that this state of affairs is still perceived as 'the one's own,' but the process of cognition is not yet as far advanced as to make it possible to proclaim 'the other' as 'one of us.' This state is defined as a threat to identity and involves controversial feelings."²⁴

Our study of adult test persons showed that the perception of a terrorist is based on the enemy image: he is an alien that would sooner inspire fear and actu-

alize your own death thoughts than induce rationalization of terror-related problems. Enemy representations are centered on egoism, aggressiveness and suspicion. "The more intense the complex of relations (animosity, dominance, aggressiveness, suspicion, egoism), the higher the level of masculinity attributed to the enemy and the lower the estimate of his externals."²⁵

Contrasting with the Russian data is what was revealed by Louis Oppenheimer's study of Dutch children aged from 7 to 13 years. He found that teenagers' enemy image differed from that in younger kids by a greater cognitive complexity. The elder children would attribute to the enemy more positive traits, something that could be an extension of their more developed vicarious quality. Asked, if there were differences between the enemy and the respondent himself, the majority of children in all age groups replied in the affirmative. But with ageing, children were progressively less certain of this difference: the former category numbered 96% among the seven-year-olds and only 59% among the 13-year-olds.²⁶ These data bespeak a growing age dynamism of cognitive complexity in interpersonal understanding and identification, as well as the ability to see the world through the eyes of another (be it even an enemy).

Our own study is evidence that the understanding of the terrorist threat and the attitude to terrorists in residents of different regions is dissimilar: a point of view resembling that of the Dutch children is only expressed by those having closer links with the Muslim medium rather than by all the test persons. The more a person is immersed in Muslim cultural traditions, the more realistic is his understanding of the causes of terrorist attacks and the nature of Islamic terrorism. The same events are interpreted differently by exponents of Muslim culture and those professing other cultural traditions in Russia. The difference follows from the dissimilarity of their worldviews and their attaching different importance to cognitive realization and the irrational sensory experience.²⁷ Of much importance in understanding terrorism and the terrorist threat are the fundamentally different types of human existence that generate dissimilar experiences and knowledge. For example, the more American Christian students familiarize themselves with Islamic spiritual texts, the less they are ready to agree that their Muslim fellow citizens are inclined to treat Christianity with disdain and prepared to desecrate its holies.²⁸

Some Western psychologists, who in their studies attempted to identify themselves looking from the positions of the terrorists, suggested a view that was totally different from what was accepted in Europe.²⁹ After a series of interviews with Islamic convicts, Jerrold M. Post came up with the conclusion that the majority of them were anything but mentally deranged persons. Quite the contrary, they were supported and respected by their communities. The families of terrorists who were wounded, taken prisoner or killed, received considerable economic aid. Participants in armed attacks were treated as heroes. A young Hamas or Fatah member was higher in status than his nonaffiliated peers.³⁰

Prohibition of *hijab* wearing has emerged as a factor fueling Christian-Muslim misunderstandings in Europe, a factor revealing the tendency to address the problem mostly on the basis of projections rather than identification. After

09/11/01, for example, writers in *Der Spiegel* grew much more critical of the hijab as a symbol of Islamic intolerance, fundamentalism, terrorism, political restriction, and oppression of women. Moreover, they saw it as an obstacle to Muslim integration in Germany. Thus, a piece of cloth became an enemy symbol, with many European politicians claiming that this headdress debases the woman, restricts her freedom, and violates human rights. Muslim women, on the contrary, assert that the nonfreedom and debasement result from others prescribing them what to wear.³¹ In Belgium, a woman client of the lawyer Ines Wouters, a mother of four children, is urging the repeal of the law that bans the covering of the face in public places. Her line of argument is that no one has compelled her to wear the *yashmac*, and she cannot understand why she has to reject it. In her view, she no longer can be a free woman coming out for shopping or whatever. She has become a prisoner of the law.

On the one hand, the arguments of the authorities are quite convincing: under public security rules it is absolutely unacceptable that anyone should go out with his or her face covered in a way preventing identification of personality. But on the other, it is clear that certain Europeans and Americans are ignorant of the Oriental cultural traditions and are characterized by a sincerely “Orientalist” conviction that it is only their understanding of human rights and dignity that is the ultimate truth. From the psychological point of view, this is a projection devoid of any attempts at an identification. Clearly, these are grounds for forming an enemy image, but you can never achieve understanding and accord with others.

* * *

So, seeing an alien and dissenter as an enemy is a human and psychological problem. It is of importance, against the background of the terrorist threat, to conduct psychological probes into people’s religious, faith-based and personal preferences. These studies should certainly include analyses of self-cognition and self-understanding, because knowing where I am different from the Other can hamper negation and negative identification of people with a dissimilar way of thinking that differs from our own. Contributing hugely to the understanding of the personality and motivations of “Muslim terrorists” is also a better knowledge of customs and behavioral standards in the Muslim sociocultural environment and the Islamic world.

NOTES

- ¹ This work was performed with financial assistance from the Russian Fundamental Research Fund (Grants No. 11-06-00018 and No. 11-06-12023-ofi-m-2011).
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